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Abstract
Three broad types of explanations can be found relative to breast cancer screening
attendance: socioeconomic characteristics (education), preferences (e.g. attitude toward
risk) and perceptions. These determinants are elicited in the experimental laboratory
on 178 women aged between 50 and 75 years old. By performing a mediation analysis,
this study aims at identifying the main drivers of screening regularity, as it is a crucial
determinant of breast cancer mortality reduction. Results show that socioeconomic
determinants (both from parents and the individual) have a strong impact. Women
whose mother passed compulsory education are more likely to hold a degree and to be
risk tolerant and hence to screen regularly. Even if more educated and richer women tend
to screen more regularly, these effects are lowered once perceptions are controlled for.
Indeed, almost all respondents overestimate their risk of developing breast cancer, but
the less educated respondents do so even more.This study reveals that risk preference is
a channel for opportunity inequalities. On the contrary, controlling for risk and benefit
perceptions tend to alleviate the role played by current socioeconomic status.
JEL classification: D03; I18
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1 Introduction
This paper aims at better understanding the socioeconomic and psychological determinants
of breast cancer (BC) screening regularity. Compliance to screening regularity guidelines, i.e.
screening every two years, is a crucial determinant of BC mortality reduction. Promoting
regular screening is especially relevant for BC because early diagnosis allows treatment at
an earlier stage which induces better survival prognosis. Recent meta-analysis of controlled
trails report that screening diminishes BC mortality by 15 to 21% (INCA (2006)) for women
older than 50 years old. If 100 000 women screen regularly during 7 to 10 years, 150 to 300
death by BC would be prevented. Leive and Stratmann (2014) find an 11 % decrease in BC
mortality since national program started in the US. In France, BC screening uptake remains
stable since 2008 (52% in the national program and an additional 10% screen opportunisti-
cally) and health professionals report that screening interval differs from the recommendeded
one.
Three main types of determinants can be brought out from the literature: socioeconomic
characteristics, perceptions and preferences. Social inequalities of access to BC screening
characterized by both educational attainment and income, are the main explanations, given
by health economists, of uptake rate differences between individuals (Carrieri and Wübker
(2013), Devaux and Looper (2012), Jusot, Or and Sirven (2012) and Or et al. (2009)). In
the psychological literature, risk perception (the probability of developing BC) and benefit
perception (the probability of being cured if one has BC) are theoretical and empirical predic-
tors of BC screening attendance (Katapodi et al. (2004) and Domenighetti et al. (2003)). A
growing number of studies relate experimentally measured risk and time preferences to health
behaviors such as smoking (Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010), Chabris et al. (2008), and
Anderson and Mellor (2008)), drinking (Sutter et al. (2013), Barsky et al. (1997)) and cancer
screening (Picone, Sloan and Taylor Jr (2004)).
The relationship between risk preference and cancer screening remains ambiguous. Even
though, theoretical models predict that risk aversion may under certain circumstances lead
2
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.22
to less diagnosis tests very scarce explicit empirical evidence are established. Besides, no
studies have investigated the influence of parents characteristics in addition to the respon-
dent’s current social characteristics on BC screening. The level of effort invested in primary
preventive care is driven by current and initial social characteristics (Tubeuf, Jusot and
Bricard (2012)), so social background may also affect secondary preventive care consump-
tion. But, socioeconomic characteristics, perceptions and preferences cannot be considered
as independent. Conflicting evidence on the sign of the relationship between perceptions and
educational attainment are reported in the literature (Katapodi et al. (2004)and Carman
and Kooreman (2014) ). Parents’ characteristics are found to influence their offspring’s pref-
erences and educational attainment (Dohmen et al. (2012)).
A structural model would be finer to consider the relationship of these determinants and
their influence on BC screening. But as the relationships are unclear, I decided to "ask the
data". Mediation analysis developed by Breen, Karlson and Holm (2013) and Karlson, Holm
and Breen (2012) does not require to formulate any hypothesis on the functional forms of
these effects and are therefore used in this study. The literature suggests two complementary
hypothesis of structure which are presented in figure 1. I first hypothesize that social back-
ground characteristics (i.e. parents characteristics) affect BC screening regularity although
the effect could work through the current socioeconomic status and preferences. The second
hypothesis concerns the influence of current socioeconomic status on BC screening regularity
and how this relationship could be mediated by risk and benefit perceptions. To measure
these determinants, data were generated in the experimental laboratory. The laboratory
provided a setting where women aged between 50 and 75 years old completed a questionnaire
including real incentivised tasks to elicit risk preferences with available assistance.
This study confirms the existing literature on the positive association between education,
risk and benefit perceptions on BC screening and provide new evidence on the positive rela-
tionship between risk tolerance and cancer screening. Mediation analysis reveals that social
background conditions are working through current socioeconomic status and risk prefer-
3
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Figure 1: Relationships between social inequalities, preferences and perceptions
ences. Educated mother tend to have more risk tolerant and educated daughters who there-
fore screen more regularly. However, the effects of socioeconomic characteristics are mediated
by perceptions. While low educated women screen less regularly, they also overestimate their
risk more than women who hold a degree. This "pessimism" may have a protective effect.
These results do not imply that causal inference are made but our rich set of controls should
go a long way to palliate some omitted variable bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides detailed literature
review on BC screening determinants. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy. Section 4
describes how data were collected and how each determinant is measured. Section 5 reports
the empirical results and section 6 discusses them and concludes.
4
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.22
2 Socioeconomic and psychological determinants influ-
ence on BC screening
2.1 Social background characteristics
Trannoy et al. (2010) look at the long-lasting effect of parents’ characteristics on health status
of their offspring in adulthood. They find that mothers’ socioeconomic status (characterized
by occupational status) has a direct effect on their descendant health status whereas their
father’s occupational status has an indirect effect on their descendant socioeconomic status.
Parent’s longevity also influence their descendants’ health status In Bricard and Jusot (2012)
smoking trajectory is related to parents’ smoking behavior and socioeconomic status charac-
terized by their occupation and educational attainment. But, social background influence not
only health (genetic transmission) and health habits but also socioeconomic characteristics.
Persistence across generations of income, educational attainment and occupation are reported
by the OECD report (d’Addio (2007)) evaluating the inter-generational transmission of social
characteristics. This is all the more important given that socioeconomic characteristics are
relevant to BC cancer screening attendance: after controlling for needs, Carrieri and Wübker
(2013) find that in many European countries including France, strong pro-wealthy and pro
highly educated inequalities exist with respect to BC screening (also in Devaux and Looper
(2012) and Or et al. (2009)). Jusot, Or and Sirven (2012) report that the chance of getting
BC screening in the past two years is on average 1.5 times higher for women on the highest
income group compared to those in the lowest one.
Inequalities of access to screening can be induced by difficulties of access to general prac-
titioners (GP) and specialists doctors (SP). As specified in the Medical Convention in the
article 12.42 of 2011 signed by GP, advising their patients to get screened for BC is part of
their responsibilities. Even though specialist doctors (SP) are not formally asked to advise
their patients to screen, gynecologists are very likely to do so. Duport and Ancelle-Park
(2006) find that having had a gynecological examination in the previous 2 years is positively
5
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associated with the use of mammography. But access to SP is still highly inequitable com-
pared to access to GP in France (Dourgnon (2013)). Access to health care conjointly depends
on how much of their expenses will be covered by the national health insurance system and
how much will be covered by their private health insurance if they have one. The better their
insurance coverage the more likely they are to undertake cancer screening (Hsia et al. (2000)
for example).
Being objectively at risk i.e. with family history of BC is supposed to be an important pos-
itive determinant of BC regular attendance. However, Kash et al. (1992)Kash et al. (1992)
provide evidence that women with family history of BC tend to avoid screening.
2.2 Perceptions
Perceived risk is one’s perception of their risk of developing BC and perceived benefit cor-
responds to the likelihood of surviving if one has BC. Perceived risk is introduced as an
important predictive variable of preventive care utilization in health psychology theories
(Health Belief Model Rosenstock, Strecher and Becker (1988) and Theory of Planned Behav-
iors Ajzen (1985)). Perceived risk is generally considered protective, as people who perceive
to be at risk are more likely to consume preventive care which may protect them (Eaker,
Adami and Sparén (2001) and Katapodi et al. (2004)). A recent theoretical paper by ? look
at the impact of risk perception on primary and tertiary prevention consumption. They
distinguish between pessimists and fatalists and show that only the pessimists increase their
prevention level, however the model setting does not consider screening cases.
Assessments of BC screening benefits includes trust in the test itself (if mammography is
effective to detect cancer) and trust in cure (if medicine and surgery work well enough to
be cured). This paper deals with the second aspect. Some studies argues that it influences
positively screening behaviors ( Champion (1999)). But effective treatment can improve sur-
vival of non-screen detected cancers (interval cancers) and might reduce the gap in survival
between screen-detected and interval cancers. Availability of modern treatment may then
6
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decrease the perceived benefit of regular screening. The negative impact of financial cost is
acknowledge in health studies (Lerman et al. (1990)). The French screening system is quite
specific such that positive price may come from different sources (more detailed explanations
are available in appendix B).
2.3 Preferences
Heterogeneity in time preferences would lead to different decisions over future consumption of
health care. Mammography can potentially lower the probability of bad health conditioning
on surviving. But having a mammography may induce immediate financial, physical and psy-
chological costs. A future-oriented person should be more likely to engage in mammography
consumption since they value the future benefits of this consumption more than its present
costs. Picone, Sloan and Taylor Jr (2004) use the Health and Retirement Survey to analyze
the effect of time preference (measured by a financial horizon question) on cancer screening.
They find that long term horizon people are more likely to get mammography compared to
short term horizon ones. Fang and Wang (2010) also use the Health and Retirement Survey
to investigate the effect of time preference on mammography use based on a discrete choice
model. They find that being present biased induces a lack of mammography use.
Studies focusing on the relationship between risk preference and preventive behaviors find
that risk seeking is significantly related to being a current smoker, heavy drinking, being
overweight or obese, and seat belt non-use (Jusot and Khlat (2013), Anderson and Mellor
(2008)). All of them correspond to primary preventive care actions, aiming at diminishing
the occurrence of a disease whereas one may expect a different influence of risk preference
for secondary preventive care actions since they aim at detecting a potentially mortal disease
with heavy treatment costs. The relationship between risk aversion and optimal preventive
care consumption is ambiguous as depicted in theoretical papers by Chiu (2000), Briys and
Schlesinger (1990), Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) and Picone, Sloan and Taylor Jr (2004).
7
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.22
Some concludes that under certain circumstances or assumptions, risk averse individuals are
less likely to undertake diagnostic test than more risk tolerant individuals. No clear empirical
evidence reporting an effect of risk preference on cancer screening was found yet.
An expanding part of the literature concentrates on the inter-generational transmission of
socioeconomic and health status. Bowles and Gintis (2002) suggest that part of the expla-
nation could be found in the inter-generational transmission of attitudes and preferences.
The hypothesis is supported by recent empirical research documenting correlations between
children and parents in the propensity to take risks (Dohmen et al. (2012)). They explain
the inter-generational transmission of risk preferences by cognitive ability and educational
attainment of parents : risk preferences could be shaped by parents’ social characteristics.
Schildberg-Hörisch et al. (2014) found a positive relationship between higher education and
income of parents and more patient and less risk seeker offspring. One canno’t ignore that ed-
ucation may also impact time and risk preferences, but these relationships are not developped
in this study.
3 Econometric strategy
3.1 Probit model
The relationship between BC screening regularity, socioeconomic and psychological variables
may be modeled such as:
Y = f(B,E,D,X, P, e) (1)
The declared regularity of screening Y is a binary variable and is observed for every individual.
Variable B represents a vector of social background characteristics. Variable E is a vector of
current social characteristics. Vector X stands for perceptions. The vector of demographic
and medical consumption characteristics D. The vector P captures individual preferences
over risk and time. Finally, the residual term e is the unobserved heterogeneity which cannot
8
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be accounted for by observed determinants. If determinants are introduced as independent
variables, their relationship would be modeled as follows:
Yi = αBi + βEi + δDi +
2∑
k=1
(γk.Xk,i) +
2∑
k=1
(pikPk,i) + ei (2)
with i = 1, ..., N and k = 1, 2 is the subscript for each preference or perception. This model
is estimated using a probit and will be referred to as the "full model".
3.2 Mediation identification
In opposition with the previous subsection 3, the interdependent relationships between the
determinants are now accounted for in the two mediation specifications.
In the first mediation specification, the objective is to estimate the total effect of background
social inequalities on BC screening regularity where the potential mediating variables effects
via current social characteristics and preferences are captured by social background char-
acteristics. Equation 3 represents this "reduced model" where mediating variables are left
out:
Yi = α
′
Bi + δ
′
Di +
2∑
k=1
(γ
′
k.Xk,i) + 1,i (3)
The total effect of background social characteristics on BC screening is measured by α′ and
its direct effect by α (in the "full model"). The difference between α′ and α is the mediating
effect or indirect effect of social background characteristics on BC screening working through
current social characteristics and preferences. However, those coefficients are not compara-
ble in the case of non linear probability model (binary outcome variable). As explained in
Kohler, Karlson and Holm (2011) and Karlson, Holm and Breen (2012) uncontrolled and
controlled coefficients can differ not only because of the indirect effect of the independent
variable on a mediating variable but also because of rescaling of the model that arises when-
ever the mediating variable has an independent effect on the outcome. It can be shown that
the resulting estimators of social background characteristics in both models are α
′
σr
for the
9
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"reduced model" of equation 3 and α
σf
for the "full model" 2. σr and σf are scale parameters
which are function of the residual standard deviation of the underlying linear model. σr is
greater than σf since adding a control mediating variable to the model reduces the unex-
plained part of the variance. Therefore, the difference between α′ and α would be affected by
the difference between coefficients and the difference between scale parameters. Because the
difference between these effects are confounded, estimating the indirect effect (i.e. difference
in coefficients) requires not to distort the differences in scales. The solution provided by
Karlson et al. (2011) is applied in this paper. The comparability problem can be overcome
by using auxiliary equations and introducing the estimated residuals of these equations in
the "full model" instead of the mediating independent variables. Then, coefficients would be
comparable, purged from the rescaling difference. The auxiliary equations for each mediating
variable are as follows:
Ei = a1Bi + d1Di +
2∑
k=1
(gk,1.Xk,i) + w1,i
P1,i = a2Bi + d2Di +
2∑
k=1
(gk,2.Xk,i) + w2,i
P2,i = a3Bi + d3Di +
2∑
k=1
(gk,3.Xk,i) + w3,i
(4)
Auxiliary equations are all estimated using linear probability models. The "full model" (Eq
2) can then be rewritten as follows.
Yi = αBi + δDi +
2∑
k=1
(γk.Xk,i) + β(a1Bi + d1Di +
2∑
k=1
(gk,1.Xk,i) + wˆ1,i)+
pi1(a2Bi + d2Di +
2∑
k=1
(gk,2.Xk,i) + wˆ2,i) + pi2(a3Bi + d3Di +
2∑
k=1
(gk,3.Xk,i) + wˆ3,i) + u1,i
(5)
10
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Simplifying this expression provides:
Yi = (α + βa1 + pi1a2 + pi2a3)Bi + (δ + βd1 + pi1d2 + pi2d3)Di+
(
2∑
k=1
γk + β
2∑
k=1
gk,1 + pi1
2∑
k=1
gk,2 + pi2
2∑
k=1
gk,3)Xk,i + βwˆ1 + pi1wˆ2 + pi2wˆ3 + u1,i
(6)
Table I summarizes the decomposition of the direct and indirect effects going through me-
diating variables. Moreover, it differentiates the indirect effect of each mediator so that one
can account for how much of the effect is going through each current social status character-
istic, risk preference and time preference. The statistical inference is calculated using Sobel’s
method Sobel (1995). In the second mediation specification, the objective is to estimate the
Total effect α′ = α + βa1 + pi1a2 + pi2a3
Direct effect α
Indirect effects βa1 + pi1a2 + pi2a3
via current social status βa1
via risk preference pi1a2
via time preference pi2a3
Table I: Decomposition of the effect of background social inequalities on BC screening
direct effect of current social characteristics and their indirect effects via risk and benefit
perceptions. It works exactly like the first mediation specification and detailed econometric
models are available in appendix A. Table II summarizes the decomposition of current social
status effect on BC screening regularity.
Total effect β ′ = β + γ1b1 + γ2b2
Direct effect β
Indirect effects γ1b1 + γ2b2
via risk perception γ1b1
via benefit perception γ2b2
Table II: Decomposition of the effect of current social status on BC screening
11
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4 The sample
4.1 Data collection
Data were obtained by means of a questionnaire survey using the experimental laboratory.
The experimental sessions were run at the "Laboratoire d’Economie Expérimentale de Paris"
(LEEP) and the Laboratory of Economics of the "Ecole Polytechnique" between June and
October 2013. Both experimental laboratory are in the region Ile-de-France which includes
Paris. Show-up fee is 20 euros, paid in cash at the end of the session with the additional
earnings which depends on the lottery outcome.
The sample is restricted to female respondents aged between 50 and 75 years1 which corre-
sponds to the targeted age category of the screening program and who can then screen in the
program and opportunistically. I exclude those respondents from the sample who have been
diagnosed with BC, as after such a diagnosis, the need for health check-ups substantially
changes. They do not make decisions on mammography use or any other preventive health
care in the same way as others do. Four women declared they already had BC and therefore
were excluded from the sample. Women who never got screened have an experience which
differs from the one who at least got screened once. Ten women declared that they never have
had BC screening and therefore were excluded from the sample. The final sample consists of
178 observations. Each observation is a woman between 50 and 75 years old who participated
in the experiment and who indicated that she already has had BC screening at least once
in her life. The following subsections decline how screening regularity and determinants are
measured.
4.2 Breast cancer screening regularity
BC screening regularity is based on declared frequency of screening. It is the answer to the
following question "How often do you screen for BC ?" Possible answers were every year,
1Eligibility to the screening program ends after 74 years old, so that women aged 75 years old could have
participated in the program until a years ago maximum.
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every two years, every three years, less than every three years, once in your life. A binary
variable is constructed upon these answers. Almost 3 out of 4 (74.7%) women declared
undertaking screening yearly or every two years (i.e. regularly).
4.3 Social background and current social status characteristics mea-
sures
Sample characteristics are available in table VII in the appendix C. The most relevant feature
are that more than half of our sample went to university and half them have income that
exceed 2500 euros per month.
4.4 Objective risk
The US National Cancer Institute (NCI) uses the epidemiological Gail model to provide
women with objective risk estimation through their website. This BC assessment tool relies
on a summary relative risk (family history, age, having children) and extra relative risk factors
(mammographic density, race etc.) to give a probability of developing BC in the remaining
lifetime. The survey only enable to fill the summary relative risk characteristics and hence
remains a approximation of BC risk. It is a continuous variable displaying a percentage
chance ranging from to 2.9 to 14.7%. The average is 6.4 which is under the national average
risk of developing BC (8-10%).
4.5 Psychological variables
4.5.1 Perceptions
Answers to the following questions are respectively used to capture risk and benefit percep-
tions2 "What do you think your percentage chance of developing breast cancer in your lifetime
is ?" and "What is your percentage chance of being cured if you had breast cancer in your
2More details on perceptions measures are provided in appendix E
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lifetime?". Figure 2 displays both perceptions distributions. There is a peak at 50% for both
of them. It can either mean they think they have 1 chance over 2 to develop BC (or 1 chance
over 2 to be cured) or it could also be interpreted as the ignorance of this probability or
refusal to answer. If an individual answered 50% to both questions (only 4% of respondents
did), it could be more assuredly interpreted as ignorance or refusal to answer. At the bottom
right of the figure, the difference between risk perception and objective risk is depiscted. If
this difference is negative, it means that the risk of developping BC is underestimated. This
is true for 15% of the sample which conversely implies that 85% of them tend to overestimate
their risk.
Financial barrier related to mammography use is captured by out-of-pocket expenses i.e. how
much they pay the day of the exam. Almost half women in the sample (48%) believe that
BC screening is free.
Figure 2: Distributions of objective risk, risk and benefit perceptions
14
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4.5.2 Preferences
The selected measure to capture risk preference is a financially incentivised measures. Details
on the choices of preferences measures are available in the Appendix D. I use Eckel et al.
(2012)’s procedure since it is easier to understand for "computation averse" individuals as
stated by Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013). This 50/50 percentage chance lottery task
consists on choosing one gamble among six possible gambles as displayed in figure III. This
measure displays 6 circles, each on of them containing a gamble with a 50% percentage
chance to win a high payoff or a low payoff. Payoffs start from 4.50 euros to 13.5 euros with
an increment of 2 when increasing and 1 when decreasing. Each gamble allows an equal
chance of winning a high payoff or a low payoff. As Eckel et al. indicated a higher return
comes with higher variance when going clockwise. The first gamble represents certainty since
one has an equal chance of wining 4.50 euros. Gamble 6 proposes a 50% chance to win 13.50
euros and a 50% chance to loose 50 cents (which supposedly looms larger because of loss
aversion) so we can identify more risk-seeking individuals. Each subject has to choose only
one gamble which is then played. Monetary gains are added to the show-up fee and given in
cash at the end of the experiment. To summarize, the more the chosen gamble displays high
payoffs the more variance in gains the subject is willing to accept so the more risk tolerant
she is. This measure aims at classifying individuals relatively to each other according to their
risk tolerance. Table III summarizes the lottery design. Option 1 corresponds to the gamble
which displays equal gains of 4.5 euros which are added to the 20 euros show-up fee. Figure
4 displays the distribution of risk preference among the sample 3. The variable is introduced
as a dummy variable which equals 1 if the respondent is risk tolerant (chose option 4 to 6).
Time preference is measured using the Consideration for Future Consequences (CFC)
scale created by Strathman et al. (1994). This psychological measure aims at capturing
how people see themselves with respect to the future. The premise is based upon existing
3Up to date, this measure has only been used on teenagers so omparing results is not really meaningful
to the study.
15
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Figure 3: Lottery design
Options
Payoffs
N (%)Low High Expected Value Variance
1 24.5 24.5 24.5 0 17.5
2 23.5 26.5 25 2.25 13.3
3 22.5 28.5 25.5 9 11.2
4 21.5 30.5 26 20.25 12.8
5 20.5 32.5 26.5 36 16
6 19.5 33.5 26.5 49.25 29.2
Table III: Summary of lottery design
literature reporting that individual who are future oriented are believed to consider in their
decision the link between their today’s behavior and its future consequences. Future oriented
individuals would be more likely to focus on goals and succeed more often in reaching them
even if it means renouncing to immediate reward and differed satisfaction. Strathman’s scale
concentrates on the degree of consideration that individual have for potential long term as
opposed to short term consequences of their actions. The shortened version of 8 items was
used in this study. Each of the 8 items is followed by a 5 point scale on which people assert
whether each one of the statements characterizes them. The obtained score is then divided
by the number of items. A low score indicates that subjects display a tendency to focus on
the future consequences rater than the immediate ones. Figure 4 presents the distribution of
the CFC score in the sample. It is almost normally distributed around the mean score.
16
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Figure 4: Consideration for future consequences score and risk preference distribution
5 Results
5.1 Full model estimations
The results of the full probit model (Eq 2) estimation are reported in column (1) of table IV.
Direct social inequatlities are driven both by educational attainment and income although
being an executive is negatively associated with regular screening (probably because of time
constraint). No evidence of direct social background inequalities is found. Living in Paris
diminishes the probability of a regular BC screening as suggested by the low uptake rate of
screening observed in the capital city and the medical supply context. Relatively frequent
visit to GP is related to regular screening. Regarding perception variables, the more one
perceives to be at risk the more likely she screens regularly. Similarly, higher expectations
about the chances of being cured is positively associated with regular screening.
Being more risk tolerant increases the probability to screen regularly. Cancer screening
may lead to bad news with cancer diagnosis, heavy treatment with potentially lower life
expectancy. The underlying psychological mechanism suggested is elaborated mainly in the
theoretical literature depicting medical test avoidance. The eventuality of a bad news may
generate anticipated anxiety or fear before the decision which leads individuals to avoid
information (Kőszegi (2003) and Barigozzi and Levaggi (2010)). The risk becomes to be
exposed to a bad news on one’s life expectancy, hence risk tolerant individuals are more
willing to take the risk of learning about their life expectancy. Following medical empirical
17
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Full model Full model Mediation 1 Full model Mediation 2
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Screening regularity Screening regularity Screening regularity
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Age 50-54 (ref)
55-59 0.840** (0.373) 0.617* (0.364) 0.837** (0.373)
60-64 0.496 (0.400) 0.297 (0.379) 0.480 (0.399)
65-74 1.105** (0.538) 0.570 (0.487) 0.842 (0.519)
Edu mother -0.280 (0.296) -0.0740 (0.272) -0.343 (0.293)
Mother alive 0.0445 (0.299) 0.168 (0.297) 0.116 (0.299)
Father alive 0.0292 (0.353) 0.130 (0.355) -0.0273 (0.352)
Education 1.383*** (0.359) 1.383*** (0.359) 1.127*** (0.334)
Income 0.503* (0.289) 0.503* (0.289) 0.362 (0.275)
Executive -0.989** (0.434) -0.989** (0.434) -0.865** (0.425)
Present oriented -0.219 (0.211) -0.219 (0.211) -0.267 (0.210)
Risk tolerant 1.238*** (0.296) 1.238*** (0.296) 1.130*** (0.284)
Objective risk -0.0867* (0.0523) -0.0762 (0.0502) -0.0469 (0.0486)
2 to 4 visits to GP (ref)
0 or 1 visit to GP 0.530 (0.350) 0.477 (0.343) 0.599* (0.351)
5 + visits to GP 0.685* (0.392) 0.436 (0.367) 0.748* (0.393)
2 to 4 visits to SP (ref)
0 or 1 visit to SP -0.386 (0.277) -0.458* (0.275) -0.549** (0.279)
5 + visits to SP -0.406 (0.433) -0.353 (0.428) -0.298 (0.429)
Chronic disease -0.419 (0.315) -0.374 (0.302) -0.517 (0.318)
Health insu -0.107 (0.163) -0.0213 (0.161) -0.0731 (0.163)
Paris -0.689** (0.301) -0.587** (0.295) -0.717** (0.302)
Risk perception 0.0234*** (0.00721) 0.0147** (0.00653) 0.0234*** (0.00721)
Benefit perception 0.0145** (0.00636) 0.00869 (0.00581) 0.0145** (0.00636)
Free 0.149 (0.280) 0.375 (0.277) 0.114 (0.278)
Constant -0.887 (1.394) 0.224 (1.192) 1.116 (1.249)
Table IV: Full model, mediation specifications 1 and 2 estimated coefficients
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evidences of cancer screening avoidance and the previously stated rationale, it may also
make sense that being objectively at risk "discourages" women to screen regularly (Kash
et al. (1992) for example).
5.2 Auxiliary equation estimations
This stage of the mediation identification is required to estimate the residuals of each aux-
iliary equation and then introduce them instead of their respective independent variables.
Table V presents the results for each auxiliary equation in both mediation specifications.
Women whose mother’s went beyond compulsory education are more likely to hold a degree,
be executive and risk tolerant. Women whose mothers are still alive tend to earn more.
This effect can be explained by the inter-generational transmission of financial and health
conditions. More educated women are more optimistic about their chances of developing BC
relatively to less educated women even though 85% of them tend to overestimate their risk.
This is consistent with Katapodi’s analysis in which women who hold a degree tend to hold
an optimistic bias. Richer women perceive to have a lower chance of being cured if they
have BC but the opposite effect applies for executive women. More future oriented women
are more likely to have private health insurance which is intuitively explained by a greater
tendency to think about future consequences. The more a woman went often to a specialist
doctor in the previous 12 months the more she thinks she has higher chance of developing BC
but also the more she thinks she will be cured if she has one. Not being able to control for
the type of specialist doctor prevents from drawing conclusions on who may have influence
their beliefs. Women with specific beliefs on their risk (hypochondriacs for instance) may
also visit specialist doctors more.
5.3 Mediation model estimations
Estimated coefficients of each mediation model are provided in the last two columns of Table
IV. Auxiliary equations estimated residuals were introduced instead of the actual indepen-
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Mediation specification 1 Mediation specification 2
Var. Educ. Income Executive Present oriented Risk tolerant Risk perc Benefit perc
Mother’s edu 0.145** 0.0279 0.244*** 0.0425 0.195** -4.727 3.305
(0.0722) (0.0748) (0.0588) (0.105) (0.0798) (3.587) (3.466)
Mother alive 0.0110 0.139* -0.0248 -0.124 -0.0109 -0.0716 5.021
(0.0759) (0.0787) (0.0618) (0.111) (0.0840) (3.600) (3.477)
Father alive -0.0219 -0.0520 -0.0287 -0.0984 0.0864 -3.409 1.612
(0.0932) (0.0967) (0.0759) (0.136) (0.103) (4.401) (4.252)
-13.60*** 4.372
Educ. (3.801) (3.672)
0.0496 -9.805***
Income (3.552) (3.431)
0.0335 8.542*
Executive (4.848) (4.684)
-1.173 -5.548*
Risk tolerant (3.379) (3.264)
-3.488 2.315
Present oriented (2.585) (2.497)
Age 50-54 (ref)
55-59 -0.0975 0.0136 -0.00277 0.168 -0.0491 0.905 -1.648
(0.0954) (0.0989) (0.0777) (0.139) (0.106) (4.520) (4.366)
60-64 -0.0559 -0.233** -0.147* 0.151 -0.0947 -0.293 -0.629
(0.108) (0.112) (0.0877) (0.157) (0.119) (5.180) (5.004)
65-74 -0.432*** -0.296** -0.233** 0.0858 -2.31e-05 -12.43** 1.944
(0.124) (0.129) (0.101) (0.181) (0.137) (6.092) (5.885)
Objective risk 0.0239* -0.0345** -0.00372 0.0110 -0.00515 2.189*** -0.790
(0.0136) (0.0141) (0.0111) (0.0198) (0.0150) (0.634) (0.612)
2-4 SP visits (ref)
0 or 1 visit -0.117 0.0442 -0.0302 -0.0600 0.0204 -6.586* -0.582
(0.0784) (0.0813) (0.0638) (0.114) (0.0867) (3.685) (3.560)
5 + visits 0.0612 0.133 0.0562 -0.110 -0.0538 0.421 6.764
(0.119) (0.124) (0.0972) (0.174) (0.132) (5.621) (5.430)
2-4 GP visits(ref)
0 or 1 visit 0.0447 -0.108 -0.0109 0.157 -0.0297 1.467 2.413
(0.0912) (0.0946) (0.0743) (0.133) (0.101) (4.328) (4.181)
5 + visits -0.0542 -0.199** -0.0862 0.280** -0.0785 3.733 -1.661
(0.0904) (0.0937) (0.0736) (0.132) (0.1000) (4.375) (4.227)
Paris 0.0429 -0.0869 0.0684 -0.0239 0.120 1.225 -3.968
(0.0791) (0.0821) (0.0645) (0.115) (0.0876) (3.758) (3.631)
Chronic disease -0.0758 -0.134 -0.109 0.127 0.110 -2.439 -2.826
(0.0836) (0.0867) (0.0681) (0.122) (0.0925) (4.011) (3.875)
Health insu 0.00336 0.0577 -0.0161 -0.102* 0.0111 0.123 2.147
(0.0408) (0.0423) (0.0332) (0.0595) (0.0451) (1.941) (1.875)
Free 0.159** 0.0402 0.168*** -0.137 0.0989 -3.586 3.402
(0.0717) (0.0743) (0.0584) (0.105) (0.0793) (3.481) (3.363)
Risk perc. -0.00571*** -0.000602 -0.00133 -0.00179 -0.00182
(0.00164) (0.00170) (0.00134) (0.00239) (0.00181)
Benefit perc. 0.00176 -0.00472*** 0.00212 0.00172 -0.00274
(0.00169) (0.00176) (0.00138) (0.00247) (0.00187)
Constant 0.573* 1.174*** 0.268 2.960*** 0.518 47.24*** 61.85***
(0.307) (0.319) (0.250) (0.448) (0.340) (15.85) (15.31)
Table V: Estimated coefficients of auxiliary equations of mediation specifications
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dent variables in these models. For example, the estimated residuals of risk and benefit
perceptions auxiliary equations are introduced in column 3 instead of the risk and benefit
perception variables.
For the first mediation specification, there is a decrease in the magnitude of mother’s ed-
ucation coefficient and an increase in the ones characterizing parents’ vital status (but not
statistically significant) when mediating variables are accounted for (column 2 compared
with column 1). For the second mediation specification, there is a decrease in the magnitude
of each coefficient characterizing the current social status when mediating variables are ac-
counted for (column 3 compared to column 1). The effect of mother’s education and current
social inequalities are soften when the mediating variables are taken into consideration.
Disentangling the indirect effects from the direct effect in the mediating specification allows us
to evaluate the relative importance of each one of them. The coefficient and standard errors
of each direct and indirect effects are presented in table VI. All inferences are performed using
the Sobel test provided in Kohler, Karlson and Holm (2011). In the first mediation specifi-
cation, social background characteristics are not significantly associated with BC screening
regularity. It essentially work through the level of education, their occupation and risk pref-
erence. More educated women have more educated daughters who are also more risk tolerant
and therefore more likely to screen regularly. The indirect effect going through occupation is
negative. Heavier time constraint and belief maybe an explanation.
Except from the direct effects of education and occupation reported before, the second me-
diation specification detects a negative indirect effect of education working through risk per-
ception and an indirect effect of income working through benefit perception. These negative
effects are explained by the fact that less educated women tend to overestimate their risk
more (i.e. more pessimistic) than women holding a degree, and richer ones perceive less ben-
efits than others. Therefore, not considering the mediation effect going via risk and benefit
perceptions may lead to an overestimation of individual’s social inequalities on BC screening
attendance. Lastly, the level of education and income affect BC screening regularity both
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directly and indirectly through perceptions.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
This study adds to the existing literature by using experimental elicitation of risk preference
and measuring time preference, risk and benefit perceptions to address the question of BC
screening regularity (as opposed to the last BC screening performed).
Some limitations related to the use of experimental and survey methods must be acknowl-
edged. First, the analysis relies on self-reported data which, given respondents anonymity,
cannot be verified. It also implies the possibility of a response bias: respondents might have
been concerned to report the motives they believed they ought to have had, rather than
the ones they actually did have. However, those biases are limited due to their identities
being hidden. Second, even though women were recruited in the less informative way with
few details on the topic were provided to potential respondents, there may still be sample
selection generated by word-of-mouth between women who participated. Women who are
more comfortable with this topic due to regular cancer screening would be more willing to
participate.
This study confirms the existence of social inequalities driven by educational attainment
and the important contribution of risk and benefit perceptions in predicting screening con-
sumption. However, perceptions do not seem to convey social inequalities. On the contrary,
not taking into consideration these psychological variables would lead to an overestimation
of what is attributable to education and income. Yet, allowing for these effects, one must
acknowledge that this study does not tackle the potential endogeneity of risk and benefit
perceptions.
This study also provides new empirical evidence on the positive relationship between risk
tolerance and BC screening. The mediation analysis informed us of the process by which
social inequalities are formed. Women whose mothers were educated are more likely to screen
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regularly as they hold a degree and are risk tolerant. Parents social characteristics are be-
yond the control of individuals. Roemer (2009) therefore suggests that these inequalities
of opportunities legitimate public interventions even more because of their higher degree of
unfairness. To provide the public deciders with recommendations on how to compensate for
these social inequalities, more research is needed to pin down the psychological mechanism
at work behind the effect of risk tolerance on BC screening.
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Appendix A Mediation specification 2
The total effect of current social status on BC screening regularity where the potential me-
diating variables effects of risk and benefit perceptions are captured by the effect of current
social status. Equation 7 represents the "reduced model" where mediating variables are left
out:
Yi = α
′′
Bi + β
′
Ei + δ
′′
Di +
2∑
k=1
(pi
′
k.Pk,i) + 2,i (7)
The total effect of woman’s current social status on BC screening regularity is measured by β ′
and its direct effect is measured by β (2). The difference between β ′ and β is the mediating
effect or indirect effect of current social characteristics on BC screening working through
perceptions. The same problem and solution than the one used for mediation specification 1
applies here. The auxiliary equations for each mediating variable are as follows:
X1,i = a4Bi + b1Ei + d4Di +
2∑
k=1
(pk,1.Pk,i) + z1,i
X2,i = a5Bi + b2Ei + d5Di +
2∑
k=1
(pk,2.Pk,i) + z2,i
(8)
As in the first mediation specification, auxiliary equations are all estimated using linear
probability models. The "full model" (Eq. 2) can then be rewritten as follows:
Yi = αBi + βEi + δDi +
2∑
k=1
(pik.Pk,i) + γ1(a4Bi + b1Ei + d4Di +
2∑
k=1
(pk,1.Pk,i) + ˆz1,i)+
γ2(a5Bi + b2Ei + d5Di +
2∑
k=1
(pk,2.Pk,i) + ˆz2,i) + u2,i
(9)
Yi = (β + γ1b1 + γ2b2)Ei + (δ + γ1d4 + γ2d5)Di+
(α + γ1a4 + γ2a5)Bi + (
2∑
k=1
pik + γ1
2∑
k=1
pk,1 + γ2
2∑
k=1
pk,2)Pk,i ++γ1zˆ1 + γ2zˆ2 + u2,i
(10)
31
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.22
Appendix B Price in the French screening system
Even though a free BC screening program exists in France since 2004, every woman is not
confronted to the same price (aside from the transportation costs). A sizable proportion of
targeted women are still screened opportunistically (outside of the program), as a result of
their own or their GP and gynecologists’ requests (10% of women opportunistically screened
on average in 2010). These screenings are not usually performed following a clinical exam
which detected a lump but as part of a preventive care scheme. In this case, they have to
pay various amount - depending on the radiologist and potential extra exams performed. A
positive price can also be due to extra exams as ultrasounds performed by the radiologist.
These extra exams may not fully reimbursed (as highlighted in report produced by Barré
and Hirtzlin (2010)) and induce out-of-pocket expenses for the patient. Hence, women are
not confronted to the same financial costs so their belief on out-of-pocket expenses from
BC screening may differ. An inverse relationship between the likelihood of participating in
screening and its financial costs is expected. Markedly, organizers of the program reported
that there is a "social services" label attached to the national screening program which serves
it badly. More wealthy women would prefer to get screened outside the program since this
label is according to them associated with bad quality.
Appendix C Sample Characteristics
The level of education is a binary variable which equals one if the respondent has tertiary
education. Monthly pretax income of the household is grouped in two categories: less or more
than 2500 euros. Occupational status is summarized by a binary variable which equals one if
the woman is an executive. Mother’s educational attainment is also a binary variable which
equals one if she went beyond compulsory education. For women whose daughter’s age are
between 50 to 75 years old education was compulsory until 13 years old until 1936 and until 14
years old up to 1959. At these age they had just obtained the "Certificat d’Etude Primaire"
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and sometimes went a little further in their studies. Parents’ vital status correspond to binary
variable which equal one if the parent is still alive. Almost all women (99%) who participated
in our experiment live in the Ile-de-France region since the experiment took place in Paris
and southern suburb. Parisian women may be specific regarding some aspects. They tend to
favor opportunistic screening as 40% of screened women screen outside the program in 2010.
This may be explained by doctors higher tendency to prescribe mammography outside the
program. Access to GP and SP is rather favored by the high medical density of the capital
city. So Parisian may be more prone to have faced positive price and be surrounded by
more doctors. However, a lot of them applies extra-billing: one SP doctor out of two applies
extra-billing in Paris. These characteristics describe the specificity of the Parisian medical
environment which may affect Parisian women’ consumption of BC screening. Additionally,
being fully covered by health insurance due to chronic disease, having private health insurance
are reported.
To check for sample representativeness, I compare the distribution of age, education level
and private health insurance coverage among the sample with national figures. The sample
is representative of the age distribution in France. But the level of education in our sample
is not, our subjects are more educated. 22% of women in our sample have a master degree
whereas national figure of 2012 indicated that 9.7% of women aged between 55 and 64 years
old have a master degree. The sample is representative of health insurance coverage in France.
All figures are available on the INSEE and ESPS websites.
Appendix D Choice of preference measures
Measuring these preferences in health decisions requires to make a trade-off between two
ranges of issues. First, the combination of domain specificity and incentivised measure is
difficult to implement in health decision. To our knowledge, the only real incentivised ex-
periment investigating risk preference with lotteries in the domain of health is the study of
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Sample(%) National Figure(%)
Higher degree obtained
High school diploma or lower 43.26 80
University degree 56.74 20
Monthly pre-tax income of the household
500-2500 euros 41.5
2501 euros and more 58.5
Executive
Executive 19
Other 81
Age
50−54 years old 23.4 23.5
55−59 years old 29.8 22.7
60−64 years old 24 22.47
65−69 years old 15 17.8
70−74 years old 8 13.5
Age Mean: 60 (6.168)
Parisian
Parisian 33.5
Living in the Suburb 66.5
Visits to specialist in the last 12 months
0-1 visit 40.5
2-4 visits 50
5+ visits 9.5
Visits to GPs in the last 12 months
O-1 visit 23.94
2-4 visits 55.85
5+visits 20.21
Coverage for chronic disease
100% coverage 23
Has health insurance
Has health insurance 91.5 94.7
Objective risk
Mean proba. of devlopping BC 6.4
Mother’s education
No education or certificat d’études primaires 60
More than certificat d’études primaires 40
Mother’s alive
Yes 50
No 50
Father’s alive
Yes 23
No 77
Table VII: Summary of individual characteristics of the sample
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Kroll, Trarbach and Vogt (2011)). They used cold water to measure risk aversion related
to physical pain. Lotteries’ outcomes requires the subject to put her hand in a cold water
bowl whose temperature could be regulated from 4 to 16 degree Celcius or for length of time
between 2 to 12 minutes. As this type of measure couldn’t be implemented in our design, a
financially incentivised measure was preferred. Financially incentivised measures are context
free and a monetary risk aversion measure would capture an exogenous personality trait.
Several experimental measures with incentivised procedure elicit risk and time preferences.
But, to select one of them, I was confronted to a second issue. The second issue is related to
the measure of time preference with an incentivised measure. Eliciting time preference in an
incentivised design implies delayed real payments. Given implementation difficulties (time
scale, money transfers or additional cost to make women come back to get the money in
several months), I could not use an incentivised measure for time preference. Instead, a psy-
chological measure of time preference was used in the questionnaire. Fewer implementation
constraints exist for the implementation of a measure of risk preferences because subjects
are paid at the end of the experiment. The Consideration for Future Consequences scale is
used. Its validity and stability have respectively been confirmed by factorial analysis and the
test-retest method even with 8 items Petrocelli (2003) instead of the 12 items of the initial
version. It has been found correlated with discount rates in Joireman et al. (2008). It was
adapted and translated in French by Demarque et al. (2010) who also confirmed its validity
in French and find similar results than those with the initial scale.
Appendix E Choice of perception measures
An ongoing literature debating on perceptions’ measurement focuses on the advantage and
inconvenient of verbal (scale with words indicating a quantity such as big and small) versus
numerical measures (subjective probability of developing BC). On the one hand people have
difficulties using numbers if limited by their numeracy level and on the other hand, verbal
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measure allows for variability in how people interpret a word and therefore the range of
probability it would encounter. Levy et al. (2006) tested three measures of risk perception of
BC: verbal, numerical and comparative. After investigating the correlations between these
measures, with a measure of actual risk (based on an epidemiological model) and screening
behavior, they provide some support for the use of the numerical measure to capture risk
perception. They don’t find variation with education level, income and age groups.
To assess gratuity perception, out-of-pocket expenses is preferred to out-of-pocket spending
(i.e. the amount after reimbursement) since making up-front payments generates the more
vulnerable people to give up on seeking medical care. The exact amount was not used in
the analysis since recalling exact amount is difficult and could lead to measurement error
whereas a clear memory of whether they paid or not is less hazardous.
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